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We identify important conflicts of interests among shareholders and examine their effects on corporate
decisions.  When a firm is considering an action that affects other firms in its shareholders' portfolios,
shareholders with heterogeneous portfolios may disagree about whether to proceed.  This effect is
measurable and potentially large in the case of corporate acquisitions, where bidder shareholders with
holdings in the target want management to maximize a weighted average of both firms' equity values.
Empirically, we show that such cross-holdings are large for a significant group of institutional shareholders
in the average acquisition and for a majority of institutional shareholders in a significant number of
deals.  We find evidence that managers consider cross-holdings when identifying potential targets
and that they trade off cross-holdings with synergies when selecting them.  Overall, we conclude that
conflicts of interests among shareholders are sizeable and, at least in the case of acquisitions, affect
managerial decisions.
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kai.li@sauder.ubc.caMuch of the corporate finance literature makes the assumption that (homogenous) 
shareholders want to maximize the value of their firm’s equity. In reality, most shareholders are 
diversified and care about the effects of managerial actions on their portfolio values, not just on 
the value of the specific firm taking the action. When shareholders have different portfolios, they 
may disagree about which actions managers should take. In acquisitions, diversified shareholders 
who hold equity stakes in both a bidder and its target—cross-holdings for short—want bidder 
management to maximize a weighted average of the bidder’s and the target’s equity values. 
Concentrated shareholders with stakes in only the bidder want management to focus on the 
bidder’s equity value, setting-up a conflict between shareholder groups.  
Managers must choose how to act in the presence of shareholders with heterogeneous 
portfolios. They could ignore this heterogeneity and simply align themselves with concentrated 
shareholders. Alternatively, they could take it into account in an attempt to maximize the wealth 
of most stockholders, or they could opportunistically use it to lower shareholder resistance to 
empire-building acquisitions. In this study, we first measure the extent of shareholder cross-
holdings and then test for their impact on target choice and deal characteristics to determine 
whether managers incorporate cross-holdings into their acquisition decisions. 
The insight that cross-holdings by shareholders alter their preferences over takeover 
decisions is a special case of the general result that diversified shareholders prefer corporate 
policies which maximize their portfolio values to policies which narrowly maximize the values 
of individual firms (Hansen and Lott (1996); Rubin (2006)). In general, however, externalities on 
other firms imposed by managers’ decisions are likely to be small or hard to estimate, so in a 
bounded-rationality framework, it makes sense for managers to focus on own firm value. In 
corporate acquisitions, one of the externalities is large and easily computed, and hence the 
opportunity to maximize the wealth of the majority (but not simultaneously all) of the 
shareholders is present. Thus, we use merger bids as our experimental setting and specifically 
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structure. 
A shareholder who owns equity in both a bidder and its target is concerned with the effect 
of a takeover bid on both firms’ stock prices. We formally show that each shareholder’s 
preferences are determined by the ratio of her percentage stake in the target to her percentage 
stake in the bidder. This ratio, which we call the bidder shareholder’s cross-holding, fully 
captures the objective function each shareholder wants bidder management to use. In particular, 
each shareholder wants bidder management to act as if the bidding firm itself owned a toehold 
equal to that shareholder’s cross-holding in the target. In all models of takeover bidding with 
toeholds considered in the prior literature, toeholds make bidders more willing to pursue an 
acquisition and to bid aggressively. Bidding firms that consider their shareholders’ cross-
holdings are therefore expected to follow a more aggressive acquisition strategy, and cross-
holdings should make a given target more attractive to bidders.  
The predicted effect of cross-holdings on observable bidding strategies and bid outcomes 
is more ambiguous. Under the null hypothesis that cross-holdings have an effect on mergers, 
managers will choose targets that have high cross-holdings, high synergies, or both. Thus, among 
targets with high cross-holdings, some will also have high synergies, but many will not. 
Although the direct effect of cross-holdings would be to increase premiums and completion 
likelihoods, the fact that they may signal low synergies produces an indirect opposite effect. As a 
result, while cross-holdings should have an observable effect on target selection and bidder 
announcement returns, the predicted effect on premiums and deal completion is ambiguous.   
Bidder managers who want to take their shareholders’ cross-holdings into consideration 
face the challenge that different shareholders have different cross-holdings in the target, with 
many bidder shareholders holding no shares in the target at all. The heterogeneity in investors’ 
cross-holdings leads to disagreements about the objective function for the bidding firm, and it is 
far from obvious which decision rule managers should adopt. We therefore use several measures 
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aggregation problem are for managers to maximize a weighted average of shareholder 
preferences, or for management to simply adopt the preferences of its median shareholder. The 
median shareholder in our context is defined such that 50 percent of the bidder’s shares are held 
by shareholders with smaller cross-holdings and 50 percent by shareholders with larger cross-
holdings. Since larger cross-holdings are associated with preferences for a more aggressive 
acquisition strategy, the median shareholder defines the most aggressive policy a bidder can 
pursue while maintaining the support of a majority of its shareholders’ votes. 
We document the magnitude of investor cross-holdings and the resulting conflicts of 
interests using takeover data and information on the portfolios of large institutional investors 
from 1984 to 2002. We show that the average bidder’s median institutional shareholder has a 
cross-holding of 5.3 percent in the target, with a median of 0.0 percent.
1 The distribution of 
cross-holdings is strongly right-skewed both across bidders and across shareholders in a given 
bidder; in five percent of the bidders, the median institution has cross-holdings of more than 40 
percent in the target. In the average bidder, 20 percent of the institutional holdings are by 
investors with cross-holdings of more than 34 percent, and 10 percent of the institutional 
holdings are by investors with cross-holdings of more than 74 percent. Hence many institutional 
investors want bidder management to act as if the bidder had a large toehold in the target, which 
in turn implies substantial disagreements between shareholders with cross-holdings and those 
without. We compute the effect of these cross-holdings on the total abnormal returns experienced 
by institutional investors around the bids, including the effect of the bid on the target’s stock 
price. We find that the median institution averages a positive 0.2 percent return improvement, or 
about 17 percent of the average bidder announcement return of −1.2 percent. 
                                                 
1 The median institutional shareholder is defined such that 50% of the institutional ownership in the bidder is by 
institutions with larger cross-holdings and 50% by institutions with smaller cross-holdings. This definition is similar 
to the definition of the median shareholder discussed before, with all percentiles re-defined relative to the total 
institutional ownership in the firm. 
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takeover targets. Target firms have significantly higher cross-holdings by bidder shareholders 
than do non-target control firms. Further, consistent with our conjecture that bidders trade off 
cross-holdings with synergies when selecting acquisition targets, we find that high cross-
holdings are associated with low post-acquisition operating performance. There is no observable 
effect of cross-holdings on bid premiums or deal completion probabilities, which supports the 
conjecture that any direct effect of cross-holdings on the aggressiveness of bidding strategies is 
mitigated by an indirect selection effect associating cross-holdings with low synergies. Finally, 
we do not find evidence that managers are using cross-holdings to facilitate empire-building 
acquisitions. We conclude that the conflicts of interests between diversified and concentrated 
shareholders in mergers are pervasive enough to matter, and that managers pay attention to the 
cross-holdings of their diversified shareholders.   
In related work, Matvos and Ostrovsky (2006) argue that investor cross-holdings may 
explain the low and often negative returns to acquiring firms in takeovers. They argue that bidder 
shareholders with large cross-holdings do not mind overpaying for targets, and hence that cross-
holdings help explain why shareholders fail to block apparently bad takeover deals. Different 
from our work, they do not analyze individual cross-holdings and instead add up bidder 
shareholders’ stakes in the target. This approach aggregates away the conflicts between 
shareholders with heterogeneous cross-holdings. Our analysis clarifies that each shareholder’s 
preferences are determined by her relative holdings in the bidder and the target, and that only 
shareholders who own a larger percentage of the target than of the acquirer favor overpayment. 
Empirically, shareholders with cross-holdings above 100 percent are rare and hold on average 
only 4.1 percent of the bidders’ equity in our data. Hence the influence of investors who favor 
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overpay.
2
The plan of the paper is as follows. The next section draws on prior theoretical work on 
toeholds to formally analyze the effects of cross-holdings on firms’ objectives, and to develop 
our null hypothesis and some testable implications. Section II describes our data and the variable 
definitions used in the empirical analysis. Section III presents summary statistics on the size and 
prevalence of cross-holdings in actual takeovers and examines their effects on target selection, 
announcement returns, takeover premiums, and the probability of takeover success. The last 
section summarizes and concludes. 
 
I. Theoretical Background and Hypothesis Development 
This section examines how cross-holdings affect shareholders’ preferences over mergers 
and acquisitions, and how bidder management may react to the heterogeneous preferences of its 
shareholders. We first analyze shareholder preferences in the two canonical classes of takeover 
models examined in the prior literature, models of tender offers in the spirit of Grossman and 
Hart (1980) and models of competitive takeover bidding in the spirit of Fishman (1988). We then 
present our null hypothesis and its testable implications.    
 
                                                 
2 Matvos and Ostrovsky (2006) also show that mutual funds that hold shares in both a bidder and its target are more 
likely to vote for mergers with negative announcement returns. This finding suggests that institutional investors do 
pay attention to interactions between the firms in their portfolios. There has also been other work on shareholder 
conflicts. Eckbo and Verma (1994) identify shareholder conflicts over dividend policy due to heterogeneous tax 
rates, information asymmetries, and agency costs. Rice (2006) demonstrates that the importance of a shareholder 
group to price formation depends on the group’s price elasticity of demand for shares, leading to a divergence 
between the effects of corporate decisions on market values and the effects of those decisions on shareholder 
welfare. Kraus and Rubin (2007) show that the conflict between diversified shareholders who want to maximize 
their portfolio values and managers who use capital budgeting rules to choose firm-value maximizing projects has 
important implications for executive compensation design. 
  5I.A. Cross-holdings in a model of tender offers with free-riding 
This section describes shareholder preferences in a Grossman and Hart (1980)-type 
setting with dispersed target shareholders. Consider a model with two firms, a bidder and a 
target. The bidder is able to create synergies worth S > 0 that are realized only if the bidder 
acquires control. To obtain control, the bidder needs to acquire 50 percent of the target shares in 
a conditional tender offer, which entails a transaction cost of k > 0. Assume that S > k so that the 
acquisition is socially efficient. All target shares are held by dispersed shareholders.  
In Grossman and Hart, atomistic target shareholders do not tender their shares at any 
price below the full post-takeover value since their own tendering decision is irrelevant for the 
outcome of the tender offer. The result is that all synergies S accrue to target shareholders, while 
bidder shareholders incur the transaction cost k. Now consider the preferences of a shareholder 
who owns αB percent of the bidder and α B T percent of the target. This shareholder wants the bidder 
to pursue an acquisition whenever her share of the associated takeover gains exceeds her share of 
the takeover costs:  











α α                  (1) 
The shareholder wants bidder management to put a weight of (αT /αB) on target value and 
to effectively internalize (α
B
T /αB
B) percent of the takeover gains accruing to target shareholders. 
But the decision rule in (1) is simply the optimal rule for a value-maximizing bidding firm that 
owns a toehold of (αT /αB) percent in the target (see for example, Shleifer and Vishny (1986), 
Hirshleifer and Titman (1990), and Chowdhry and Jegadeesh (1994)). Hence a bidder 
shareholder with relative cross-holdings of (α
B
T /αB
B) wants bidder management to act as if the 
bidder itself had a toehold of (αT  /αB). In the extreme, a shareholder who owns a higher  B
  6percentage of the target than of the bidder and thus has a cross-holding larger than 100 percent 
would benefit from overpayment for the target.
3
 
I.B. Cross-holdings in a model of competitive takeover bidding 
This section examines shareholder preferences in models in which two or more bidders 
compete for a target, and in which the Grossman-Hart free-rider problem plays no role. Most 
papers in this literature use an “ascending clock” auction, in which the bid price is gradually 
increased and the bidders choose whether to remain in the auction or to drop out. The last 
remaining bidder wins and has to pay the price at which the second-to-last bidder withdrew. For 
simplicity, we assume that there are only two bidders, labeled 1 and 2, and that both bidders are 
risk neutral. Let Vi denote the private value of the target to bidder i, and assume that both V1 and 
V2 exceed the value of the target under current management. Bidder 1’s and bidder 2’s strategies 
consist of choosing price ceilings C1 and C2, respectively, at which to withdraw from the auction, 
given that the rival is still bidding. The winning bidder is obligated to accept all tendered shares, 
including any toehold shares tendered by the rival bidder. Target shareholders tender their shares 
to the auction winner as long as the final price exceeds the value of the target under incumbent 
management.  
Now consider the preferences of a shareholder who owns αB percent of bidder 1 and α B T 
percent of the target. This shareholder receives αB
B
                                                
 percent of any takeover gains accruing to 
bidder 1 in case bidder 1 wins the auction, and the shareholder sells her αT percent target stake at 




3 It may seem surprising that shareholder preferences are independent of the size of the bidder relative to the target. 
However, this result obtains because the impact of a larger relative bidder value on the shareholder’s wealth (αBVB) 
is exactly offset by the smaller effect on the bidder value due to overpaying for a relatively smaller target. 
Intuitively, a shareholder with stakes in both firms simply receives αB percent of any takeover gains accruing to the 
bidder and αT percent of any gains accruing to the target, independently of the relative sizes of the two firms. 
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The payoff function puts a relative weight of one on the takeover gains to bidder 1 in case that 
bidder wins, and a relative weight of (αT /αB) on the takeover price paid, independently of which 




B) percent in the target and sells that toehold in case a rival wins the auction (Burkhart 
(1995); Singh (1998)).  
To summarize, we have shown that both in free-rider models based on Grossman and 
Hart (1980) and in models of competitive bidding based on Fishman (1988) and Burkhart (1995), 
a shareholder with percentage stakes αB in the bidder and α B T in the target wants bidder 
management to act as if the bidder itself owned a toehold of size (αT /αB
B). This motivates our 
focus on the distribution of these cross-holdings among bidder shareholders in Section III.  
 
I.C. Aggregation of shareholder preferences by bidder management 
The cross-holdings are by construction shareholder-specific and range from zero to above 
100 percent in most bidder-target combinations. Bidder management thus faces the question of 
how to aggregate the preferences of its shareholders into a decision rule for the overall firm. 
Even if we assume that bidder managers wish to maximize the welfare of their shareholders, it is 
far from obvious what acquisition strategy managers should adopt since any strategy has to favor 
the preferences of one set of shareholders over others. Theory provides little guidance as to how 
bidder management should aggregate its shareholders’ preferences, and what weight to attach to 
the target value in its objective function. Two intuitively appealing solutions to the aggregation 
problem are for managers to adopt the preferences of its median shareholder, or for managers to 
maximize a weighted average of shareholder preferences. 
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which are supported by the owners of a majority of its shares. The median shareholder is defined 
such that 50 percent of bidder shares are held by investors with larger cross-holdings and 50 
percent by investors with smaller cross-holdings. Since larger cross-holdings make a shareholder 
prefer a more aggressive acquisition strategy, the median shareholder defines the most 
aggressive strategy managers can implement while retaining the support of a majority of 
shareholders’ votes. 
The median-shareholder criterion by design ignores the preferences of most shareholders. 
Alternatively, bidder managers may try to maximize a weighted average of all their shareholders’ 
subjective preferences. While it is not obvious what weights management should use to 
aggregate shareholder preferences, most reasonable weighting schemes would imply that bidders 
shift to a more aggressive acquisition strategy even if only 10 or 20 percent of their shareholders 
have equity stakes in a target.
4 In Section III, we document both the preferences of the median 
shareholder and of the subsets of bidder shareholders with the highest cross-holdings, and 
examine whether their preferences are reflected in acquisitions. 
Cross-holdings will only affect real-world acquisitions if bidder management does in fact 
consider the portfolios of its shareholders, or if diversified shareholders have the means to 
impose portfolio-value maximization on management. A priori, there are several reasons to 
expect that managers may ignore the cross-holdings their shareholders have in other firms. Large 
concentrated shareholders such as founding families or venture capitalists are unlikely to own 
any cross-holdings in target firms, but are likely to be active in corporate governance and to exert 
influence over managers. Further, the compensation of top executives is heavily biased towards 
stock options and restricted stock and thus ultimately depends on own-firm performance 
                                                 
4 Drèze (1974) uses shareholders’ ownership stakes as weights to aggregate heterogeneous shareholder preferences. 
Interestingly, applying this weighting scheme to cross-holdings amounts to simply adding up the bidder 
shareholders’ percentage stakes in the target, and hence yields aggregate preferences as if there were a perfect 
coalition among bidder shareholders. This degree of coordination between shareholders is not realistic and we opt 
not to use this aggregation scheme in the empirical analysis. We do, however, consider the possibility that the largest 
institutional shareholders may align their preferences through negotiated side-payments. 
  9(Murphy (1999)).
5 Hence managers are given strong incentives to maximize the performance of 
their own firm, but few obvious incentives to care about any externalities they impose on other 
firms in their shareholders’ portfolios. 
The degree to which cross-holdings will matter thus depends on the ability of cross-
holding investors to influence bidder management. Shareholders with cross-holdings may be able 
to influence acquisition decisions through their representatives on boards of directors, voting at 
shareholders’ meetings, or private or public communication with the management team (Smith 
(1996); Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach (1998)). This kind of influence is most likely for 
institutional investors and for blockholders, which are therefore the focus of our empirical 
analysis. Whether bidder management takes its shareholders’ portfolios into account is ultimately 
an empirical question which we attempt to answer in Section III. 
 
 
I.D. Hypothesis development and testable implications 
Our null hypothesis is that bidder managers take their shareholders’ cross-holdings into 
account in target selection and structuring deals, while our alternative hypothesis is that cross-
holdings have no effect on mergers. Assuming that the null hypothesis prevails, how would the 
bidder’s acquisition strategy change? In Grossman and Hart (1980), a toehold bidder receives 
some of the takeover gains accruing to target shareholders, making it more likely that the bidder 
is able to cover the acquisition cost and hence more likely that the bid goes ahead. Cross-
holdings by bidder shareholders in a target should thus make an acquisition bid more likely. 
Hence, we expect: 
•  Testable Implication 1: There is a positive association between cross-holdings by a bidder’s 
shareholders and, ceteris paribus, the likelihood that a firm will be targeted by that bidder.  
                                                 
5 This raises the question of why managerial contracts are written this way to begin with. While beyond the scope of 
this paper, we offer the following considerations. First, incentives are endogenous and negotiated between managers 
and the board. If concentrated shareholders dominate corporate governance and boards, then incentive contracts will 
reflect their preferences. Second, moving away from firm-value maximization as the objective function in designing 
executive compensation schemes may have costs, e.g., create more opportunities for managers to maximize their 
own welfare at the expense of shareholders. 
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In models of competitive takeover bidding, a toehold makes it optimal for a bidder to bid 
more aggressively and to even raise its bid above its own valuation for the target. The more 
aggressive bidding strategy increases the bidder’s expected capital gain on the toehold should a 
rival win and purchase the toehold. Hirshleifer and Titman (1990), and Chowdhry and Jegadeesh 
(1994) conclude that the probability of takeover success increases in the size of the bidder’s 
toehold. Cross-holdings by bidder shareholders in a target should therefore motivate bidder 
management to bid more aggressively.  
Empirically, however, we only observe the net effect of cross-holdings on target selection 
and on bid aggressiveness. If firms select targets by trading off cross-holdings with synergies, 
then a substantial fraction of targets with high cross-holdings will have lower than average 
synergies.
6 To the extent that we are unable to perfectly measure synergies, this confounds our 
analysis. For example, a bid where a high premium is paid for a target with low synergies and 
high bidder shareholder cross-holdings may be indistinguishable from a bid where a normal 
premium is paid for a target with high synergies and low shareholder cross-holdings. Moreover, 
the benefits of more aggressive bidding accrue only to bidder shareholders with cross-holdings 
and not to the bidding firm itself. We predict:  
•  Testable Implication 2: Ceteris paribus, there is a negative association between cross-
holdings and synergies. 
•  Testable Implication 3: The net effects of cross-holdings on premiums and completion rates 
are ambiguous, while their effect on bidder announcement returns is negative. 
 
 Under the null hypothesis, bidder managers may choose to take their shareholders’ cross-
holdings into account for the opportunistic purpose of reducing their resistance to empire-
building acquisitions. If the motivation is management driven, then we would still expect to see 
an effect of cross-holdings in target selection, but not necessarily in bid characteristics. More 
importantly, we would expect to see this type of managerial behavior concentrated in poorly 
                                                 
6 Based on the same argument, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Hirshleifer and Titman (1990) show that toeholds are 
associated with lower bid premiums as toeholds allow acquisitions with lower value-added to proceed. 
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selection, we expect:  
•  Testable Implication 4: There is a positive association between cross-holdings and poor 
governance in the bidding firm.  
 
II. Sample Formation and Variable Construction 
 
II.A. Sample selection 
We begin with all announced (both completed and cancelled) US mergers with 
announcement dates between January 1, 1984 and December 31, 2002 as identified from the 
Mergers and Acquisitions database of the Securities Data Company (SDC). We identify all deals 
where both the bidder and the target are public firms and the form of deal was coded as a merger, 
an acquisition of majority interest, or an acquisition of assets. After applying the above filters, 
we get 8,075 deals. The sample period is chosen because the information in SDC is less reliable 
before 1984 and we require data on post-merger performance. 
Next, we match our bidders and targets with Compustat and CRSP data, and only retain 
an acquisition if the bidder owns less than 50 percent of the target prior to the bid and is seeking 
to own greater than 50 percent after the bid. For completed deals, we require that the bidder 
owns more than 90 percent of the target after the deal completion. These filters yield 2,885 deals.   
Finally, we merge our acquisition data with the CDA/Spectrum 13F data on institutional 
shareholdings in the bidder and the target.
7 Ideally, we would also like to measure cross-holdings 
at the individual investor level. Using data on institutional investors adds a layer of 
intermediation between individual investors and firms, and makes it difficult to assess the extent 
to which the ultimate owners of the assets are diversified across firms. However, given the 
greater size of their stakes, the cross-holdings of institutional investors are more likely to be 
                                                 
7 A 1978 amendment to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 requires all institutions with greater than $100 
million of equity securities under discretionary management to report every quarter all common-stock positions 
greater than 10,000 shares or $200,000 using the SEC’s form 13F. 
  12reflected in company policies than the cross-holdings of individuals. When interpreting our 
results it is nevertheless useful to keep in mind that we do not observe the portfolios of non-
institutional investors and therefore miss potentially significant cross-holdings. In a similar vain, 
an institutional portfolio reported to the SEC may be an aggregate of multiple distinct portfolios 
managed by the institution, adding noise to our measure of cross-holdings. Our final sample has 
2,815 merger deals where both the bidder and the target have data on institutional shareholdings 
in the quarter-end prior to the bid announcement. 
 
II.B. Variable construction 
From Section I we know that bidder shareholders’ preferences are determined by their 
cross-holdings, defined as their percentage ownership of the target divided by their percentage 
ownership of the bidder. Since different shareholders have different cross-holdings, their 
preferences over acquisitions are heterogeneous. We therefore adopt three complementary 
approaches to describing the distribution of cross-holdings across shareholders. Given that we do 
not observe the portfolios of non-institutional investors, we focus most of our discussion on the 
cross-holdings of institutional investors and restrict our sample to bidders that have at least 20 
percent of their equity owned by institutions. This restriction excludes firms in which 
institutional investors are unlikely to have any influence on management.  
The first approach to measuring shareholder preferences captures what percentage of the 
institutional holdings in the bidder is by investors with large cross-holdings, and what percentage 
by investors with small or no cross-holdings. Figure 1 illustrates the approach. Specifically, we 
order all institutional investors in the bidder by their cross-holdings, and then calculate the 
(marginal) cross-holding for the top 1, 5, 10, 20, and 50 percent of institutional shareholdings 
(labeled as the top-1%, top-5%, top-10%, top-20%, and median cross-holdings, respectively). 
For example, a top-10% cross-holding of 75 percent means that 10 percent of the institutional 
ownership in the bidder is controlled by investors with cross-holdings of at least 75 percent. Of 
  13particular interest is the cross-holding of the median institutional shareholder in the bidder. This 
median cross-holding determines the set of acquisition policies the bidder can pursue while 
maintaining the support of the majority of its institutional shareholders’ votes. To complement 
the analysis for institutional shareholders, we also calculate and report cross-holdings for all 
shareholders of the bidder by making the conservative assumption that all non-institutional 
investors have zero cross-holdings. 
The above approach to measuring cross-holdings ignores the fact that shareholders differ 
greatly in their ability to impose their preferences on bidder management. We expect 
management to be most responsive to the preferences of its largest shareholders; hence our next 
two approaches look explicitly at the cross-holdings of blockholders, defined as institutional 
investors who own at least five percent of the bidder’s shares. Specifically, we order the 
blockholders by their cross-holdings, and then report the (marginal) cross-holding for the top 5, 
10, 20, 50, 75, and 100 percent of all shares owned by blockholders, in parallel to the 
calculations for all institutional investors described above.   
Finally, we consider the possibility that blockholders might coordinate their actions and 
negotiate side-payments with each other. With costless bargaining, the Coase Theorem (Coase 
(1960)) predicts that the blockholders should act in unison and support any acquisition that is 
profitable for all blockholders combined. The aggregate preferences of any coordinated group of 
investors are determined by their combined cross-holdings, given by the sum of their equity 
stakes in the target divided by the sum of their stakes in the bidder. In reality, coordination 
between blockholders may not be costless and side-payments are likely to be restricted by law.
8 
Hence the blockholders’ combined cross-holdings should be interpreted as an upper bound on 
the cross-holding the blockholders may bring to bear on the bidding firm’s decision process. 
 
                                                 
8 The Securities and Exchange Commission passed new rules in 1992 allowing shareholders to directly 
communicate with each other (SEC (1992)). Thus, the costs of creating shareholder coalitions were substantially 
reduced. 
  14III. Empirical Results 
In this section, we first present an overview of our sample with a focus on the magnitude 
of shareholder cross-holdings. Then, we formally test the null hypothesis that shareholder cross-
holdings do matter in target selection and present evidence on the effect of cross-holdings on 
post-merger operating performance. Finally, we examine the role of cross-holdings in 
determining bid characteristics and outcomes in a multivariate regression framework, and 
explore alternative explanations to our findings. 
 
III.A. Sample overview 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on the announced merger deals, the bidders, and the 
targets. In Panel A, we show that 75 percent of the announced deals are eventually completed. A 
quarter of the deals use only cash as the method of payment, and over 40 percent of the deals are 
pure stock swaps. Approximately 13 percent of the targets receive competing bids within one 
year. The sample is split evenly between diversifying and within-industry deals. The mean 
relative deal size, defined as the ratio of the transaction value to the market value of the bidder, is 
30 percent. Consistent with the prior literature, there are few direct toeholds, and more than 95 
percent of the bidders have no toehold at all in their targets. On average, the bidder is offering a 
premium of 45 percent above the market price of the target as of four weeks before the bid. 
In Panel B, we show that the average three-day abnormal announcement period return 
(CAR3) for the bidder is –1.2 percent, while the average CAR3 for the target is close to 20 
percent. Following Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988), we also compute the dollar amount of the 
synergistic gains (= bidder CAR3 × bidder market capitalization + target CAR3 × (1 – toehold) × 
target market capitalization) as well as the percentage synergy gains (= synergy in dollars 
/(bidder market capitalization + (1 – toehold) × target market capitalization). Panel B shows that 
the average synergies amount to about $47 million in 2002 dollars, corresponding to an average 
  15percentage gain of about 2 percent. This implies that, once we account for the large positive 
announcement return to the target, mergers in our sample are on average welfare-improving. 
Panels C and D present summary statistics on the bidders and targets in our sample, 
respectively. Consistent with the relative size variable, the bidders are much larger than their 
targets in terms of both book and market values. The bidders and targets have similar levels of 
leverage, while the bidders appear to enjoy faster sales growth, better operating performance, and 
higher stock returns in the year prior to the bid. 
Table 2 presents summary statistics of institutional shareholdings in the bidders and 
targets. On average, institutional investors own 46 percent of the equity of bidding firms and 32 
percent of the equity of targets. Bidder institutions that also own shares in the target control 14 
percent of all bidder shares, or 31 percent of the bidder shares owned by institutions. While 
target institutions that also own shares in the bidder control a similar 18 percent of all target 
shares, they own over half of the generally smaller institutional holdings in the target. 
 
III.B. The size and pervasiveness of cross-holdings 
Table 3 summarizes the empirical distribution of cross-holdings in the bidders and 
targets. In Part I of Panel A, we calculate cross-holdings for the top 1, 5, 10, 20, and 50 percent 
of the bidders’ institutional shareholders and limit our sample to bidders with total institutional 
ownership no less than 20 percent. This reduces our sample by only 16 percent to 2,356 
observations. We find that the average cross-holding by the median institutional shareholder is 
5.3 percent, with a median of 0.0 percent. The distribution of cross-holdings across bidders is 
strongly right-skewed; in five percent of the bidders, the median institution has cross-holdings of 
at least 40 percent, and in one percent of the bidders, the median cross-holding is at least 87 
percent. Focusing on the largest cross-holdings, we find that the average top-10% cross-holding 
is 75 percent, and that the average top-5% cross-holding is 140 percent.  
  16In Part II of Panel A, we calculate cross-holdings for the top 1, 5, 10, 20, and 50 percent 
of all bidder shareholders, assuming that the cross-holdings of non-institutional investors are 
zero. With this assumption, we find that the average median cross-holding is only 0.3 percent. 
This low number is a direct result of the assumed zero cross-holdings for non-institutional 
investors and of the fact that the median shareholder is an institution in less than half of the 
bidders in our sample. However, even under these assumptions, the average top-10% cross-
holding is 30 percent. We also compute the fraction of bidder shares whose holders own a higher 
percentage stake of the target than of the bidder. We find that bidder shareholders with cross-
holdings greater than one are rare and control on average only 4.1 percent of the bidder’s equity 
and only 10.1 percent of the total institutional holdings in the bidder. This means that the 
influence of shareholders who favor actual overpayment for the target is likely to be small.  
We conclude that there is a substantial number of institutional investors with large cross-
holdings in the average bidder, and that there is a significant set of mergers in which even the 
median institution owns a large stake in the target. At the same time, many institutional 
shareholders of the bidder have no cross-holdings in the target at all, implying significant 
conflicts of interests over the objective function of the bidder.  
The above analysis ignores the differences in the power of different shareholders to 
impose their preferences on bidder management. We therefore focus next on large shareholders. 
Table 4 presents summary statistics of cross-holdings held by blockholders, defined as 
institutions that own at least five percent of the shares of a firm. Part I of Panel A shows that the 
average cross-holding by the median blockholder is 11 percent (median 0.0 percent), and that in 
five percent of the bidders, the median blockholder has a cross-holding of 82 percent or more in 
the target. Turning to blockholders with large cross-holdings, the average top-20% cross-holding 
exceeds 18 percent, and the average top-10% cross-holding is almost 20 percent. These numbers 
suggest that there is a significant number of institutional blockholders, the subset of institutional 
investors most likely to influence bidder management, with large cross-holdings in the target. 
  17In Part II of Panel A we examine what would happen if blockholders were to negotiate 
side-payments with one another and act as a group. The average combined cross-holding by all 
blockholders in the bidder is 12 percent. The distribution is again skewed, with the median of the 
combined cross-holding equal to zero. In ten percent of all deals, however, blockholders want 
management to act as if the bidder had a 46 percent toehold in the target, and in five percent of 
all deals as if the bidder had a 69 percent toehold in the target. For comparison, Betton, Eckbo, 
and Thorburn (2005) analyze toeholds held directly by acquirers in a comprehensive sample of 
twelve thousand bidders and find that only 11 percent of the bidders own any toehold in the 
target. In their sample, the average toehold size among bidders with a positive toehold is 21 
percent, with a median of 17 percent.
9
Of course, target shareholders can have cross-holdings in the bidder as well, so Tables 3 
and 4 present analogous information for target shareholders’ cross-holdings in the bidder. We 
find similar, but generally higher cross-holdings held by target shareholders in the bidder. This is 
likely a mechanical outcome driven by the relatively greater institutional interest in bidders 
observed in Table 2.  
 
III.C. Wealth effects of bid announcements 
Next we examine to what extent the wealth effects of takeovers on bidder shareholders 
change when we take their cross-holdings in the target into account. To address that question, we 
introduce the concept of a return improvement. First define the total abnormal announcement 
return for an institutional investor in a bidder as 
Total Abnormal Announcement Return   Bi B Ti T VV α α = ⋅Δ + ⋅Δ                         (3) 
where α is the percentage shareholding by institution i in either the bidder (subscript B) or in the 
target (subscript T) and ΔV is the abnormal change in firm value, computed as the product of the 
                                                 
9 Similar, if somewhat higher, numbers have been documented before by, among others, Bradley, Desai, and Kim 
(1988), Jarrell and Poulsen (1989), Jennings and Mazzeo (1993), and Betton and Eckbo (2000). 
  18bidder’s or target’s market value and the corresponding abnormal announcement period return. 
The return improvement is the difference between the total abnormal announcement return and 
the bidder abnormal announcement period return. This measure thus captures the improvement 
in return experienced by a given bidder shareholder due to her ownership stake in the target. 
Table 5 presents the return improvement for institutional investors in the bidder, ordered 
once more by the size of their cross-holdings. Part I limits the sample to bidders with total 
institutional ownership no less than 20 percent. We find that the average return improvement for 
the median institutional shareholder is 0.2 percent, with a median of 0.0 percent. The distribution 
of return improvement is somewhat skewed; in five percent of the bidders, the median institution 
has a return improvement of 1.7 percent or better, while in one percent of the bidders, the median 
institution has a return improvement of 6.2 percent or better. Focusing on bidder institutions with 
large cross-holdings, we find that the average return improvement for the institution with the top-
10% cross-holding is 2.5 percent; for the institution with the top-5% cross-holding, it is 3.7 
percent. As a reference point, the average bidder announcement return in our sample is −1.2 
percent (see Table 1, Panel B).
10 Thus, we conclude that, in general, the return improvement 
provided by cross-holdings is moderate, but that in some cases, it is large relative to the average 
announcement effect. 
Part II of Table 5 presents the return improvement for all shareholders, assuming 
individual shareholders have zero cross-holdings. There remain moderate improvements across 
bidder shareholders with non-trivial cross-holdings, although as expected the improvements are 
not as big as those in Panel A. 
 
                                                 
10 These fairly modest return improvements are a direct consequence of the fact that most targets are small relative 
to their acquirers; the median relative deal size, which is the ratio of transaction value to market value of the bidder, 
is only 10 percent. In untabulated analysis, we calculate return improvements for bids whose relative deal size is in 
the top quartile of all bids. Not surprisingly, the average return improvements are substantially larger for this subset 
of bids and reach 6.3 percent for the institution with the top-10% cross-holding and 8.4 percent for the top-5% cross-
holding. 
  19III. D. The effect of cross-holdings on target selection 
  In the next three sub-sections, we formally examine the null hypothesis that managers 
account for their shareholders’ cross-holdings when making decisions about acquisitions. The 
literature on toeholds has shown that the presence of a toehold increases the bidding likelihood, 
so we start our investigation by examining the role of cross-holdings in target selection. To 
examine the first testable implication of our null hypothesis, we compare the cross-holdings of 
bidder shareholders in the actually chosen targets to their cross-holdings in a sample of 
alternative targets that were not chosen. 
  Our control sample of potential target firms is obtained by first identifying the set of all 
CRSP/Compustat firms that were neither targets nor bidders in our merger sample and that have 
institutional shareholding data available from CDA. This forms the base set of potential control 
firms. For each actual target in our sample, we select a control firm from its Fama-French (1997) 
industry that is closest in market capitalization (requiring that the difference does not exceed 25 
percent of the sample firm market capitalization) at the fiscal year-end prior to the bid 
announcement.
11 Matching is done with replacement and only one control firm is matched to 
each sample firm. We are able to match 2,427 control firms to target firms in our sample. We 
refer to the matching firms as potential targets. 
  In Table 6, Panel A, we present summary statistics for the potential targets, which can be 
compared to the corresponding statistics for the actual targets presented in Table 1, Panel D. 
There is no statistical difference between the actual and potential target samples across most firm 
characteristics, including the extent of institutional shareholding. This suggests that we have 
found valid control firms for the targets. The only significant difference between the potential 
and actual target firms is that the potential targets tend to have higher market-to-book ratios. 
  Table 6, Panel B presents the empirical distribution of cross-holdings by bidder 
shareholders in the potential targets. Comparing these figures to those in Panel A of Table 3, it is 
                                                 
11 Our main inferences remain unchanged if we impose different size matching criteria. 
  20clear that the cross-holdings by bidder shareholders in the actual targets are larger than in the 
potential targets (except where the cross-holdings are zero in both samples). Tests of differences 
in means and medians show that the cross-holdings by bidder shareholders in the chosen targets 
are significantly different from those in the control sample.  
An alternative explanation for the difference in cross-holdings are unobservables, that is, 
institutions may invest in firms that are similar along some dimension that we do not observe, 
and that same similarity may make those firms more likely to merge. While this explanation is 
plausible for within-industry acquisitions, it is less likely to apply to diversifying acquisitions. It 
would have to be the case that institutions invest in firms across different industries based on 
some unobservable dimension that also makes these firms more likely to merge with each other. 
We check whether the difference in cross-holdings for actual versus potential targets holds for 
both diversifying and non-diversifying mergers, and indeed it does. We conclude that cross-
holdings by bidder shareholders are an important consideration in bidder management’s choice 
of targets. 
In untabulated results, we also examine the time-series of cross-holdings in the four 
quarters before a bid announcement. We find no evidence that cross-holdings in either party 
increase in the quarters leading-up to the bid. Thus, we find no evidence that institutions can 
predict bids or that they systematically increase their holdings in potential merger partners to 
trigger (or in anticipation of) a possible deal. Finally, we also confirm that the cross-holdings do 
not change significantly during the announcement quarter. If anything, we find that bidder 
shareholders with low cross-holdings tend to sell their stakes in the target, while bidder 
shareholders with high cross-holdings maintain their positions after the bid announcement. 
 
  21III. E. The effect of cross-holdings on synergies 
Under the null hypothesis that cross-holdings matter in mergers, we conjecture that 
bidders select targets by trading off cross-holdings with synergies, and hence that synergies are 
on average lower for bids with higher bidder shareholder cross-holdings. Empirically, it is a 
challenge to measure synergies ex ante, suggesting that we could test our second testable 
implication by comparing the operating performance of firms with different cross-holdings ex 
post. If the conjectured selection effect is true, then mergers associated with higher bidder cross-
holdings will have lower post-merger operating improvements—our proxy for cost-
reduction/efficiency-based synergies—than those associated with low cross-holdings. . To focus 
on deals which are important to the bidding firm and its shareholders, we require that the target’s 
size is at least five percent of the size of the bidder for these regressions.
12  
Table 7 presents the test results. The dependent variables are industry-adjusted returns on 
assets from one-year up to three-years after the merger. The key explanatory variables are the 
bidder’s top-20% and median cross-holdings. Given the difficulty of working with post-merger 
operating performance, the results are surprisingly strong. There is a significant negative relation 
between bidder shareholders’ top-20% cross-holdings and post-merger operating performance. 
The estimated effect grows with the time horizon and is significant for two- and three-year 
average post-merger ROAs. At the three-year horizon, a two standard deviation change in top-
20% cross-holdings lowers the industry-adjusted ROA by 1.8 percent per year. These results 
support our conjecture that bidder management trades-off synergies and cross-holdings in target 
selection. 
 
III.F. The effect of cross-holdings on merger outcomes 
We next turn to the deal itself, examining the bidder and target abnormal announcement 
period returns, bid premiums, and the likelihood of deal completion as per our third testable 
                                                 
12 All results are qualitatively unchanged when we include deals with smaller targets in the regressions. 
  22implication. The prior literature has found toeholds to be associated with higher returns to the 
bidder, lower bid premiums, and a higher probability of takeover success, and to have an 
ambiguous effect on target shareholder returns.
13 We predicted that cross-holdings have a 
negative effect on bidder announcement returns, and we predicted an ambiguous effect on 
premiums and deal completion. Panels A to D of Table 8 summarize our test results. The key 
explanatory variables are once more the bidder’s and target’s median and top-20% cross-
holdings, while other control variables are based on the prior literature. 
Throughout, we find no effect of cross-holdings held by bidder shareholders on either 
announcement period returns, bid premiums, or the likelihood of deal completion. This result is 
robust in a wide variety of specifications; in untabulated regressions we have used cross-holdings 
calculated for alternative percentiles of the bidder’s equity, we have experimented with dummy 
variables identifying bidders with extraordinarily high cross-holdings, and we have re-estimated 
our regressions for various subsets of the full sample chosen on the basis of deal size.
14 Further, 
we have examined whether an effect becomes apparent only after 1992, when the SEC rules 
governing shareholder communication changed (SEC (1992)). We find no difference following 
the rule change. Focusing on the cross-holdings of bidder blockholders, either individually or as 
a group, shows similarly no effect of cross-holdings on any of the outcome variables.  
Given that bidder managers are taking cross-holdings into account in target selection, 
they are clearly aware of the cross-holdings, and it seems unlikely that they start ignoring them 
subsequently. Rather, the results in Tables 7 and 8 are most consistent with our conjecture that 
bidders select targets by trading off cross-holdings with synergies. Since we are unable to 
perfectly control for synergies in Table 8, we only observe the net effect of cross-holdings on 
                                                 
13 On toeholds and bidder returns see Betton and Eckbo (2000), on toeholds and bid premiums see Walkling and 
Edmister (1985) and Betton and Eckbo (2000), on toeholds and the probability of takeover success see Walkling 
(1985), Jennings and Mazzeo (1993), and Betton and Eckbo (2000), and on toeholds and target shareholder returns 
see Eckbo and Langohr (1989), Jarrell and Poulsen (1989), Franks and Harris (1989), Stulz, Walkling, and Song 
(1990), and Betton and Eckbo (2000).  
14 We have also repeated the analysis after removing all institutional investors whose investment strategy appears to 
be that of an indexer. These “quasi-indexers” are identified following the approach in Bushee (1998). The inferences 
are unchanged. 
  23target selection and on bid aggressiveness. Hence chosen targets with high cross-holdings are 
likely to have lower synergies than targets with low cross-holdings, and the data may show, for 
example, that targets with high cross-holdings garner no higher premiums than those without. 
What this sample selection mechanism cannot explain are the insignificant bidder announcement 
returns. Because the benefits of more aggressive bidding accrue only to bidder shareholders with 
cross-holdings and not to the bidding firm itself, we had predicted a negative effect of cross-
holdings on bidder announcement returns. 
We do find some evidence in Panels A to C that higher cross-holdings held by target 
shareholders in the bidder are associated with higher bidder announcement returns, lower target 
announcement returns, and lower bid premiums. This may suggest that large cross-holdings by 
target shareholders in the bidder weaken the target’s takeover defenses and lead to a less 
expensive acquisition for the bidder. The estimated coefficients on other control variables are in 
keeping with expectations.  
 
III.G. The relationship between cross-holdings and governance 
The above results are broadly consistent with the conjecture that managers 
opportunistically take advantage of shareholder cross-holdings to reduce shareholder resistance 
to empire-building acquisitions. This interpretation also predicts higher cross-holdings for firms 
selected as targets, consistent with the results of Section III.D. However, we would expect this 
type of managerial behavior to be most prevalent in poorly governed firms. Thus, as per our final 
testable implication, we predict that higher bidder shareholder cross-holdings in chosen targets 
are associated with bidders that have the worst governance.  
As our proxy for the quality of corporate governance, we use the Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick (2003) G-index, which is an aggregate measure of the level of shareholder rights in each 
firm. We also include a modification to the G-index, the entrenchment- or E-index, in our 
analysis. Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2006) develop the E-index by showing that only the six 
  24most economically motivated of the 24 provisions in the G-index are significantly associated 
with firm value.  
Table 9 presents the correlation matrix between our measures of corporate governance 
and our measures of cross-holdings. For comparison, we also include total institutional 
ownership in the bidder and the target. Higher levels of the governance indexes indicate worse 
governance. Contrary to our fourth testable implication, we find a significant negative correlation 
between cross-holdings and the E-index, suggesting that managers in poorly governed firms are 
not more likely to pursue targets in which bidder shareholders have large cross-holdings. The 
correlations between the G-index and the cross-holdings measures are negative but insignificant. 
There is no pattern in the correlations between the governance indexes and total institutional 
ownership. The G-index is moderately positively correlated with the bidder’s institutional 
ownership, while the E-index has a slightly higher but still moderate negative correlation with 
the target’s institutional ownership. One interpretation of the latter finding is that poorly 
governed firms avoid targeting firms with a lot of institutional monitoring, perhaps to avoid 
inheriting those institutions in a stock-swap. We conclude that our evidence does not support the 
alternative explanation that managers use cross-holdings to reduce resistance to empire-building 
acquisitions.     
 
IV. Summary and Conclusion 
This paper identifies and measures conflicts of interests among shareholders caused by 
differences in their portfolio compositions, and examines their effects in the case of corporate 
acquisitions. Diversified shareholders prefer corporate policies which maximize their portfolio 
values to policies which narrowly maximize the value of individual firms, and shareholders with 
different portfolios disagree about which actions firms should pursue. While the problem of 
shareholder heterogeneity examined here is general, the large premiums paid in acquisitions 
make it acute in this setting.  
  25We show how to correctly measure the shareholder preferences created by cross-
holdings, and we document their size and effects in takeover data from 1984 to 2002. We find 
that the average acquirer’s median institutional shareholder has a cross-holding of 5.3 percent in 
the target; the average top-10% cross-holding is above 74 percent; and in five percent of the 
acquisitions even the median institution has a cross-holding of 40 percent or more. The average 
return improvement experienced by the median institutional shareholder is 0.2 percent, offsetting 
about 17 percent of the average bidder announcement return of −1.2 percent. At the same time, 
many institutional shareholders of the bidder have no cross-holdings in the target at all, implying 
substantial disagreements over the objective function of the bidder.  
We test the null hypothesis that cross-holdings by bidder shareholders matter in mergers, 
and find evidence that bidders consider their shareholders’ cross-holding when picking targets. 
Further, the operating performance of the merged firm is worse for bids associated with higher 
bidder shareholder cross-holdings. We find no observable effect of cross-holdings on the bidding 
strategies used by acquirers. Finally, if anything, the target selection result appears driven by 
better governed firms rather than poorly governed firms. 
Our results are most consistent with bidder managers selecting targets along the 
dimensions of both synergies and cross-holdings, such that chosen targets with high cross-
holdings by bidder shareholders will tend to have lower synergies. With insufficient controls for 
synergies, aggressive bidding strategies for high cross-holding (and lower synergy) targets 
appear similar to normal bidding strategies for low cross-holding (and higher synergy) targets. 
Thus, the direct effect of cross-holdings on acquisition strategy and the indirect effect on synergy 
through target selection may effectively cancel each other out and lead to the observed non-
effect. This stands in contrast to effects found in the extant literature for toeholds held directly by 
the bidder. However, in the case of direct toeholds, bidder management identifies a high synergy 
target and endogenously chooses to establish a toehold. In the case of cross-holdings, bidder 
management must take their shareholders’ cross-holdings as given. 
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  29Figure 1 
Bidder Institutional Investors’ Cross-holdings in the Target  
 
This figure illustrates how the bidder institutional shareholders’ cross-holdings in the target are measured. We first 
rank all bidder institutional investors by their cross-holdings in the target, defined as their percentage ownership of 
the target divided by their percentage ownership of the bidder. Using this ranking, we then calculate the marginal 
cross-holdings associated with the top 1, 5, 10, 20, and 50 percent of institutional shareholdings. In the example 
illustrated below, one percent of the bidder’s institutional shareholdings are owned by shareholders with cross-
holdings of at least 116%, and hence the top-1% cross-holding is set to 116 percent. Twenty percent of the bidder’s 
institutional shareholdings are by shareholders with cross-holdings of at least 45 percent, and hence the top-20% 
cross-holding is 45 percent. Finally, the median institutional shareholder has a cross-holding of 24 percent in the 
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  30Table 1 
Summary Statistics on Merger Bids, Bidders, and Targets, 1984-2002  
 
The sample consists of 2,815 acquisitions announced during the period January 1, 1984, to December 31, 2002. The 
bidders and targets are listed in the SDC’s Mergers and Acquisitions database and have institutional holding data in 
the CDA/Spectrum database. We keep an acquisition if the bidder owns less than 50 percent of the target prior to the 
bid and is seeking to own greater than 50 percent of the target. For completed deals, we require that the bidder owns 
more than 90 percent of the target after the deal completion. All dollar amounts are in 2002 millions of dollars, all 
percentages are in real numbers. 
 
 
Panel A: Deal Characteristics 
Complete, All Cash, All Stock, Competing, and Diversifying are dummy variables that take the value of one for 
completed acquisitions, if only cash is used to pay for the acquisition, if only equity is used, if there are multiple 
bids for the same target within one year, if the bidder and target are from two different industries, respectively, and 
zero otherwise. Relative Size is the transaction value divided by the market value of bidder assets at the end of the 
fiscal year prior to the bid announcement. Toehold measures the percentage of the target’s shares held by the bidder 
prior to the bid announcement. Premium is the ratio of the final offer price to the target’s trading price four weeks 
prior to the original announcement date minus one.  
 







            
Complete 2815  0.753  0.431  0.000  1.000  1.000 
All Cash  2815  0.256  0.437  0.000  0.000  1.000 
All Stock  2815  0.415  0.493  0.000  0.000  1.000 
Competing 2815  0.134  0.341  0.000  0.000  1.000 
Diversifying 2815  0.477  0.500  0.000  0.000  1.000 
Relative Size  2600  0.298  0.653  0.004  0.101  1.081 
Toehold 2815  0.006  0.043  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Premium 2508  0.447  0.524  -0.057  0.365  1.160 
 
 
Panel B: Announcement Period Returns, Synergy, and Total Returns 
The abnormal announcement period returns (CAR3) are over days (−1, 1), where day 0 is the date of the initial bid 
announcement by the acquiring firm. Daily abnormal stock returns are computed using the market model and the 
value-weighted CRSP index. The estimation window is days (−200, −60) prior to the acquisition announcement 
date. Following Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988), the percentage synergy gain is defined as the cumulative abnormal 
return over the (−1, +1) event window for a value-weighted portfolio of the target and bidder. The weights for the 
bidder and the target are based on the market value of equity two days prior to the bid announcement. The target 
weight adjusts for the percentage of target shares held by the acquirer prior to the announcement of the deal, with the 
adjustment set to zero for missing toehold values. The dollar value synergistic gain over the same event window (−1, 
+1) is defined as the percentage synergy gain times the sum of the market values of equity for the bidder and the 
target in million dollars, again adjusted for the percentage of target shares held by the acquirer prior to the 
announcement of the deal.  
 







            
Bidder CAR3  2815  -0.012  0.085  -0.129  -0.009  0.092 
Target CAR3  2815  0.196  0.248  -0.072  0.145  0.628 
Synergy ($)  2815  46.813  1451.867  -624.124  8.261  916.737 
Synergy (%)  2815  0.020  0.084  -0.082  0.012  0.143 
 
  31Panel C: Bidder Characteristics 
 







            
Market Capitalization  2815  8901  29487  50  1512  35670 
Market Value Total Assets  2815  20148  57655  87  3390  94310 
Book Value Total Assets  2815  13710  43250  56  1977  60871 
Sales 2815  5010  11555  33  1087  23364 
Market  Leverage  2808 0.162 0.140 0.000 0.134 0.433 
Book  Leverage  2808 0.227 0.176 0.000 0.204 0.543 
Market-to-Book  Ratio  2815 2.068 2.705 0.974 1.398 4.991 
Sales  Growth  2815 0.345 1.155  -0.149 0.136 1.200 
Return  on  Assets  2815 0.151 0.177  -0.019 0.143 0.415 
Prior Year Stock Return  2815  0.316  0.802  -0.401  0.193  1.264 
Prior Year Mkt-Adj Return  2815  0.162  0.786  -0.525  0.038  1.091 
 
 
Panel D: Target Characteristics 
 







          
Market Capitalization  2815  1213  4905  13  154  5097 
Market Value Total Assets  2815  4208  22022  25  411  13334 
Book Value Total Assets  2815  3495  20498  17  292  10803 
Sales 2815  1292  4634  12  177  5823 
Market  Leverage  2810 0.176  0.167 0.000 0.137  0.503 
Book  Leverage  2810 0.223  0.204 0.000 0.185  0.606 
Market-to-Book  Ratio  2815 1.672  1.535 0.856 1.207  3.713 
Sales  Growth  2815 0.242  0.940  -0.221 0.103  0.952 
Return  on  Assets  2815 0.094  0.195  -0.178 0.105  0.333 
Prior Year Stock Return  2815  0.173  0.816  -0.641  0.080  1.072 
Prior Year Mkt-Adj Return  2815  0.018  0.805  -0.743  -0.077  0.902 
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Summary Statistics on Institutional Ownership in Bidders and Targets, 1984-2002  
 
The sample consists of 2,815 acquisitions announced during the period January 1, 1984, to December 31, 2002. The 
bidders and targets are listed in the SDC’s Mergers and Acquisitions database and have institutional holding data in 
the CDA/Spectrum database. We keep an acquisition if the bidder owns less than 50 percent of the target prior to the 
bid and is seeking to own greater than 50 percent of the target. For completed deals, we require that the bidder owns 
more than 90 percent of the target after the deal completion. All dollar amounts are in 2002 millions of dollars, all 
percentages are in real numbers. 
 
 
Panel A: Institutional Ownership in Bidders 
Total Institutional Ownership is the fraction of a bidder’s stock that is owned by institutional investors. Total 
Blockholder Ownership is the fraction of a bidder’s stock that is owned by block institutional investors with share 
ownership no less than five percent. Bidder Institutions Owning Shares in Target gives the total shareholdings in the 
bidder by institutions who also own shares in the target. Fraction of Bidder Institutional Ownership Owned by 
Institutions with Shares in Target gives the percentage of the bidder’s institutional ownership that is held by 
institutions who also own shares in the target.  
 







         
Total  Institutional  Ownership  2815 0.464 0.232  0.064 0.485  0.827 
Total  Blockholder  Ownership  1692 0.153 0.101  0.053 0.125  0.357 
Bidder Institutions Owning Shares in Target   2815  0.144  0.142  0.002  0.091  0.442 
Fraction of Bidder Institutional Ownership  
Owned by Institutions with Shares in Target  2815  0.309  0.242  0.014  0.251  0.790 
 
 
Panel B: Institutional Ownership in Targets 
Total Institutional Ownership is the fraction of a target’s stock that is owned by institutional investors. Total 
Blockholder Ownership is the fraction of a target’s stock that is owned by block institutional investors with share 
ownership no less than five percent. Target Institutions Owning Shares in Bidder gives the total shareholdings in the 
target by institutions who also own shares in the bidder. Fraction of Target Institutional Ownership Owned by 
Institutions with Shares in Bidder gives the percentage of the target’s institutional ownership that is held by 
institutions who also own shares in the bidder.  
 







         
Total  Institutional  Ownership  2815 0.324 0.233  0.016 0.280  0.759 
Total  Blockholder  Ownership  1764 0.160 0.108  0.054 0.133  0.376 
Target Institutions Owning Shares in Bidder   2815  0.179  0.172  0.002  0.123  0.543 
Fraction of Target Institutional Ownership 
Owned by Institutions with Shares in Bidder  2815 0.535 0.282  0.044 0.551  0.981 
  33Table 3 
Summary Statistics on Cross-holdings By Shareholders in Bidders and Targets  
 
The sample consists of 2,815 acquisitions announced during the period January 1, 1984, to December 31, 2002. The 
bidders and targets are listed in the SDC’s Mergers and Acquisitions database and have institutional holding data in 
the CDA/Spectrum database. We keep an acquisition if the bidder owns less than 50 percent of the target prior to the 
bid and is seeking to own greater than 50 percent of the target. For completed deals, we require that the bidder owns 
more than 90 percent of the target after the deal completion. All dollar amounts are in 2002 millions of dollars, all 
percentages are in real numbers. 
 
 
Panel A: The Cumulative Distribution of Cross-holdings by Bidder Shareholders 
Cross-holdings are defined as the ratio of the shareholder’s percentage ownership in the target divided by her 
percentage ownership in the bidder. We order all institutional investors by their cross-holdings, and then report the 
(marginal) cross-holding for the top 1, 5, 10, 20, and 50 percent of institutional shareholdings (labeled as the top-
1%, top-5%, top-10%, top-20%, and median cross-holdings, respectively). We require that at least 20 percent of the 
bidder’s equity is owned by institutions for this analysis. In addition to the analysis for institutional shareholders, we 
calculate cross-holdings for all the bidder’s shareholders under the conservative assumption that all non-institutional 
investors have zero cross-holdings. Here the percentiles are with respect to all shareholders, and we do not impose 
the requirement that institutional investors own at least 20 percent of the bidder. Bidder Institutional Holdings with 
Cross-holding ≥ 1 gives the total shareholdings in the bidder by institutions whose cross-holdings are larger than 
one. Fraction of Bidder Institutional Holdings with Cross-holding ≥ 1 gives the percentage of the bidder’s 
institutional ownership that is owned by institutions with cross-holdings larger than one. We report cross-holdings 
for percentiles of (the actually observed) institutional investors in Part I and for percentiles of all shareholders in 
Part II of Panel A.  
 














I: Cross-holding by All Institutional Investors from Bidders with Total Institutional Ownership ≥ 0.2 
Top-1%  Cross-holding  2356 4.631 4.895 3.281  6.223  10.216  13.309  22.759 
Top-5%  Cross-holding  2356 1.396 1.281 1.154  1.905  2.976  3.740  5.683 
Top-10%  Cross-holding  2356 0.747 0.733 0.619  1.139  1.720  2.125  3.065 
Top-20%  Cross-holding  2356 0.344 0.451 0.100  0.616  1.027  1.224  1.639 
Median  Cross-holding  2356 0.053 0.162 0.000  0.000  0.162  0.397  0.866 
              
II: Cross-holding by All Bidder Shareholders 
Top-1%  Cross-holding  2815 2.544 2.567 1.764  3.564  6.023  7.619  11.209 
Top-5%  Cross-holding  2815 0.661 0.752 0.431  1.102  1.706  2.168  3.078 
Top-10%  Cross-holding  2815 0.295 0.445 0.000  0.533  1.009  1.232  1.689 
Top-20%  Cross-holding  2815 0.099 0.236 0.000  0.013  0.402  0.718  1.019 
Median  Cross-holding  2815 0.003 0.029 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.079 
             
Bidder Institutional Holdings with 
Cross-holding ≥ 1   2815 0.041 0.047 0.025  0.058  0.103  0.139  0.217 
Fraction of Bidder Institutional 
Holdings with Cross-holding ≥  1  2815 0.101 0.127 0.063  0.135  0.235  0.326  0.619 
  34Panel B: The Cumulative Distribution of Cross-holdings by Target Shareholders 
Cross-holdings are defined as the ratio of the shareholder’s percentage ownership in the bidder divided by her 
percentage ownership in the target. We order all institutional investors by their cross-holdings, and then report the 
(marginal) cross-holding for the top 1, 5, 10, 20, and 50 percent of institutional shareholdings (labeled as the top-
1%, top-5%, top-10%, top-20%, and median cross-holdings, respectively). We require that at least 20 percent of the 
target’s equity is owned by institutions for this analysis. In addition to the analysis for institutional shareholders, we 
calculate cross-holdings for all the target’s shareholders under the conservative assumption that all non-institutional 
investors have zero cross-holdings. Here the percentiles are with respect to all shareholders, and we do not impose 
the requirement that institutional investors own at least 20 percent of the target. Target Institutional Holdings with 
Cross-holding ≥ 1 gives the total shareholdings in the target by institutions whose cross-holdings are larger than one. 
Fraction of Target Institutional Holdings with Cross-holding ≥ 1 gives the percentage of the target’s institutional 
ownership that is owned by institutions with cross-holdings larger than one. We report cross-holdings for percentiles 
of (the actually observed) institutional investors in Part I and for percentiles of all shareholders in Part II of Panel B.  
 














I: Cross-holding by All Institutional Investors from Targets with Total Institutional Ownership ≥ 0.2 
Top-1%  Cross-holding  1763 4.533 3.984 3.607  5.802  8.834  11.757  20.729 
Top-5%  Cross-holding  1763 1.569 1.049 1.412  2.039  2.814  3.410  5.160 
Top-10%  Cross-holding  1763 0.953 0.646 0.950  1.301  1.684  2.084  2.986 
Top-20%  Cross-holding  1763 0.507 0.440 0.436  0.824  1.071  1.231  1.756 
Median  Cross-holding  1763 0.089 0.168 0.005  0.103  0.311  0.484  0.769 
              
II: Cross-holding by All Target Shareholders 
Top-1%  Cross-holding  2815 2.069 1.927 1.601  2.953  4.436  5.689  8.494 
Top-5%  Cross-holding  2815 0.596 0.640 0.398  1.034  1.528  1.795  2.396 
Top-10%  Cross-holding  2815 0.280 0.409 0.018  0.492  0.969  1.124  1.501 
Top-20%  Cross-holding  2815 0.099 0.220 0.000  0.043  0.399  0.654  0.968 
Median  Cross-holding  2815 0.005 0.033 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.008  0.151 
             
Target Institutional Holdings with 
Cross-holding ≥  1    2815 0.037 0.043 0.022  0.054  0.094  0.125  0.190 
Fraction of Target Institutional 
Holdings with Cross-holding ≥ 1  2815 0.135 0.162 0.093  0.175  0.295  0.434  0.927 
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Summary Statistics on Cross-holdings By Block Institutional Investors in Bidders and Targets  
 
The sample consists of 2,815 acquisitions announced during the period January 1, 1984, to December 31, 2002. The 
bidders and targets are listed in the SDC’s Mergers and Acquisitions database and have institutional holding data in 
the CDA/Spectrum database. We keep an acquisition if the bidder owns less than 50 percent of the target prior to the 
bid and is seeking to own greater than 50 percent of the target. For completed deals, we require that the bidder owns 
more than 90 percent of the target after the deal completion. All dollar amounts are in 2002 millions of dollars, all 
percentages are in real numbers. 
 
 
Panel A: The Cumulative Distribution of Cross-holdings by Bidder Blockholders  
Cross-holdings are defined as the ratio of the shareholder’s percentage ownership in the target divided by her 
percentage ownership in the bidder. This table focuses on large shareholders, defined as blockholders with 
ownership no less than five percent. The sample is restricted to deals with at least one blockholder in the bidder. We 
order the blockholders by their cross-holdings, and then report the (marginal) cross-holding for the top 5, 10, 20, 50, 
75, and 100 percent of blockholdings (labeled as the top-5%, top-10%, top-20%, median, top-75%, and all cross-
holdings, respectively). We compute two cross-holding measures: for all blockholders, and for all blockholders 
combined assuming they exchange side payments and act as a group (combined cross-holding). We present the 
empirical distribution of the two measures in Parts I and II of Panel A, respectively.  
 













I: Cross-holding by All Bidder Blockholders 
Top-5%  Cross-holding  1692 0.199 0.418 0.000  0.154  0.799  1.135  1.936 
Top-10%  Cross-holding  1692 0.199 0.418 0.000  0.154  0.799  1.135  1.936 
Top-20%  Cross-holding  1692 0.181 0.395 0.000  0.125  0.711  1.060  1.834 
Median  Cross-holding  1692 0.109 0.300 0.000  0.015  0.392  0.820  1.470 
Top-75%  Cross-holding  1692 0.071 0.245 0.000  0.000  0.156  0.512  1.385 
All  Cross-holding  1692 0.069 0.243 0.000  0.000  0.149  0.497  1.385 
              
II: Combined Cross-holding by All Bidder Blockholders   
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Panel B: The Cumulative Distribution of Cross-holdings by Target Blockholders 
Cross-holdings are defined as the ratio of the shareholder’s percentage ownership in the bidder divided by her 
percentage ownership in the target. This table focuses on large shareholders, defined as blockholders with ownership 
no less than five percent. The sample is restricted to deals with at least one blockholder in the target. We order the 
blockholders by their cross-holdings, and then report the (marginal) cross-holding for the top 5, 10, 20, 50, 75, and 
100 percent of blockholdings (labeled as the top-5%, top-10%, top-20%, median, top-75%, and all cross-holdings, 
respectively). We compute two cross-holding measures: for all blockholders, and for all blockholders combined 
assuming they exchange side payments and act as a group (combined cross-holding). We present the empirical 
distribution of the two measures in Parts I and II of Panel B, respectively.  
 













I: Cross-holding by All Target Blockholders  
Top-5%  Cross-holding  1764  0.214  0.379  0.016 0.272 0.722 1.002 1.698 
Top-10%  Cross-holding   1764  0.213  0.377  0.016 0.270 0.721 1.000 1.675 
Top-20%  Cross-holding   1764  0.202  0.363  0.012 0.241 0.701 0.986 1.646 
Median  Cross-holding    1764  0.114  0.269  0.000 0.078 0.377 0.701 1.348 
Top-75%  Cross-holding   1764  0.077  0.217  0.000 0.019 0.252 0.514 1.070 
All  Cross-holding    1764  0.073  0.215  0.000 0.015 0.233 0.505 1.070 
              
II: Combined Cross-holding by All Target Blockholders  
Combined  Cross-holding 1764  0.132  0.251  0.010 0.149 0.433 0.699 1.136 
 Table 5 
Return Improvement for Bidder Shareholders Around Merger Announcements 
 
The sample consists of 2,815 acquisitions announced during the period January 1, 1984, to December 31, 2002. The bidders and targets are listed in the SDC’s 
Mergers and Acquisitions database and have institutional holding data in the CDA/Spectrum database. We keep an acquisition if the bidder owns less than 50 
percent of the target prior to the bid and is seeking to own greater than 50 percent of the target. For completed deals, we require that the bidder owns more than 
90 percent of the target after the deal completion. All dollar amounts are in 2002 millions of dollars, all percentages are in real numbers. The return improvement 
for each bidder institutional shareholder is computed as the difference between her total abnormal announcement return and the bidder abnormal announcement 
period return. The total abnormal announcement return for each bidder institutional shareholder is the ownership-weighted average abnormal return on her stakes 
in the bidder and the target and is defined in equation (3). The abnormal announcement period returns (CAR3) are over days (−1, 1), where day 0 is the date of 
the initial bid announcement by the acquiring firm. Daily abnormal stock returns are computed using the market model and the value-weighted CRSP index. The 
estimation window is days (−200, −60) prior to the acquisition announcement date. We report the distribution of return improvement for different institutional 
investors based on their cross-holdings as defined in Table 3 Panel A. 
 
 













             
I. Return Improvement by All Institutional Investors from Bidders with Total Institutional Ownership ≥ 0.2 
Top-1%  by  Cross-holding  2356 0.066 0.102 0.030  0.102  0.190  0.255  0.427 
Top-5%  by  Cross-holding  2356 0.037 0.066 0.012  0.053  0.118  0.169  0.284 
Top-10%  by  Cross-holding  2356 0.025 0.051 0.004  0.032  0.086  0.127  0.216 
Top-20%  by  Cross-holding  2356 0.014 0.034 0.000  0.012  0.051  0.086  0.149 
Median  by  Cross-holding  2356 0.002 0.012 0.000  0.000  0.004  0.017  0.062 
             
II. Return Improvement by All Bidder Shareholders 
Top-1%  by  Cross-holding  2815 0.051 0.088 0.019  0.078  0.156  0.213  0.380 
Top-5%  by  Cross-holding  2815 0.023 0.050 0.002  0.026  0.080  0.121  0.221 
Top-10%  by  Cross-holding  2815 0.012 0.031 0.000  0.008  0.042  0.076  0.149 
Top-20%  by  Cross-holding  2815 0.005 0.019 0.000  0.000  0.011  0.034  0.091 
Median  by  Cross-holding  2815 0.000 0.004 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.004 Table 6 
The Effect of Cross-holdings on Target Selection  
 
Our control sample of potential target firms is obtained by first identifying all CRSP/Compustat firms that were neither targets nor bidders in our merger sample. 
This forms the base set of potential control firms. For each target in our sample, we select a control firm in the same Fama-French (1997) industry with the 
closest market capitalization to that of the sample firm (requiring that the difference does not exceed 25% of the sample firm market capitalization) at the fiscal 
year-end prior to the bid announcement, and with institutional shareholding data from the CDA. Matching is done with replacement and only one control firm is 
matched to each sample firm. We end up with 2,427 control firms for target firms in our sample. Panel A presents the summary statistics of our control sample. 
Panel B presents the cumulative distribution of cross-holdings by bidder shareholders in target control firms. The last two columns of each panel present the p-
values of tests for differences in means and medians, respectively, from the corresponding figures for the actual targets, presented in Tables 1 and 3.  
 
 













Percentile   T-Test 
Median 
Test 
               
Market Capitalization  2427  935.203  3715.906  14.447  146.642  3970.715    1.000  1.000 
Market Value Total Assets  2427  3025.615  15324.166  26.635  361.859  9413.135    0.358  0.153 
Book Value Total Assets  2427  2492.444  14024.565  12.819  248.012  7678.903    0.315  0.009 
Sales 2427  983.157  4812.033  6.702  154.140  4065.943    0.528  0.010 
Market Leverage  2423  0.177  0.178  0.000  0.130  0.527    0.760  0.446 
Book Leverage  2423  0.231  0.238  0.000  0.185  0.641    0.113  0.602 
Market-to-Book Ratio  2427  1.940  2.383  0.881  1.277  5.117    <0.001  <0.001 
Sales Growth  2427  1.065  32.888  -0.250  0.117  1.067    0.220  0.009 
Return on Assets  2427  0.089  0.242  -0.264  0.112  0.366    0.653  0.242 
Prior Year Stock Return  2427  0.181  0.854  -0.627  0.080  1.184    0.757  0.628 
Prior Year Mkt-Adj Return  2427  0.026  0.839  -0.729  -0.084  1.014    0.753  0.917 
Total Institutional Ownership   2427  0.322  0.231  0.018  0.277  0.758    0.474  0.487 40
Panel B: The Cumulative Distribution of Cross-holdings by Bidder Shareholders in Target Control Firms 
 












Percentile  T-test 
Median 
Test 
                  
I: Cross-holding by All Institutional Investors from Bidders with Total Institutional Ownership ≥ 0.2 
Top-1%  Cross-holding  2023 4.125 5.143 2.479  5.381  9.450  13.648  23.366    0.009  <0.001 
Top-5%  Cross-holding  2023 1.166 1.281 0.888  1.601  2.626  3.546  6.213    <0.001  <0.001 
Top-10%  Cross-holding  2023 0.581 0.690 0.367  0.938  1.473  1.884  2.953    <0.001  <0.001 
Top-20%  Cross-holding  2023 0.242 0.384 0.000  0.387  0.875  1.086  1.516    <0.001  <0.001 
Median  Cross-holding  2023 0.025 0.105 0.000  0.000  0.025  0.155  0.629    <0.001  <0.001 
                  
II. Cross-holding by All Bidder Shareholders 
Top-1%  Cross-holding  2427 2.194 2.530 1.388  2.952  5.259  7.147  11.465    <0.001  <0.001 
Top-5%  Cross-holding  2427 0.512 0.693 0.167  0.870  1.437  1.856  2.880    <0.001  <0.001 
Top-10%  Cross-holding  2427 0.208 0.378 0.000  0.277  0.799  1.061  1.533    <0.001  <0.001 
Top-20%  Cross-holding  2427 0.059 0.182 0.000  0.000  0.177  0.452  0.940    <0.001  <0.001 
Median  Cross-holding  2427 0.001 0.013 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.012    0.016 0.326 
 Table 7 
Cross-holdings and Synergies 
 
The sample consists of 897 completed acquisitions announced during the period January 1, 1984, to December 31, 
2002. The bidders and targets are listed in the SDC’s Mergers and Acquisitions database and have institutional 
holding data in the CDA/Spectrum database. We keep an acquisition if the bidder owns more than 90 percent of the 
target after the deal completion. All dollar amounts are in 2002 millions of dollars, all percentages are in real 
numbers. We further require that the relative size of the deal is no less than 5 percent and the total institutional 
ownership in the bidder is no less than 20 percent. Columns (1)-(2), (3)-(4), and (5)-(6) are regression results using 
industry-adjusted one-year, two-year, and three-year post-merger annualized returns on assets, respectively, as the 
dependent variables. Pre-merger firm characteristics as explanatory variables are also industry-adjusted. All model 
specifications employ robust standard errors. Superscripts ***, **, and * correspond to statistical significance at the 
1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. P-values are reported in brackets. 
 



















        
Bidder Top-20% Cross-holding  -0.011    -0.017*    -0.020**   
  [0.304]   [0.072]   [0.019]  
Bidder Median Cross-holding    0.009    0.003    0.001 
   [0.699]   [0.912]   [0.964] 
All  Cash  0.015 0.017 0.014 0.017 0.014 0.017* 
  [0.198] [0.132] [0.195] [0.120] [0.174] [0.094] 
All  Stock  0.022** 0.022** 0.022***  0.022***  0.021***  0.021*** 
  [0.025] [0.027] [0.006] [0.007] [0.004] [0.005] 
Competing  -0.027* -0.027* -0.021 -0.020 -0.017 -0.017 
  [0.085] [0.085] [0.186] [0.190] [0.223] [0.230] 
Diversifying  0.006  0.007 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
  [0.512] [0.445] [0.857] [0.978] [0.840] [0.995] 
Relative  Size  -0.008 -0.012  0.001 -0.005  0.008  0.002 
  [0.556] [0.359] [0.944] [0.690] [0.494] [0.882] 
Bidder Total Institutional Ownership  0.007  0.015  -0.007  0.002  -0.017  -0.006 
  [0.836] [0.635] [0.780] [0.936] [0.476] [0.780] 
Bidder  Market  Capitalization  0.004 0.002 0.005**  0.003 0.006**  0.003 
  [0.126] [0.395] [0.047] [0.258] [0.011] [0.130] 
Bidder  Market  Leverage  0.110** 0.106** 0.102***  0.098***  0.102***  0.097*** 
  [0.020] [0.023] [0.002] [0.002] [<0.001] [<0.001] 
Bidder  Market-  to-Book  Ratio  0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 
  [0.280] [0.267] [0.424] [0.403] [0.482] [0.451] 
Bidder  Return  on  Assets  0.300*** 0.302*** 0.280*** 0.283*** 0.277***  0.281*** 
  [<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] 
Intercept  -0.006 -0.002 -0.004 0.001  -0.008  -0.003 
  [0.793] [0.942] [0.834] [0.965] [0.619] [0.860] 
        
Number  of  Observations  897 897 897 897 897  897 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.151 0.150 0.182 0.179 0.209  0.205 
 Table 8 
The Effects of Cross-holdings on Mergers 
 
The initial sample consists of 2,815 acquisitions announced during the period January 1, 1984, to December 31, 
2002. The bidders and targets are listed in the SDC’s Mergers and Acquisitions database and have institutional 
holding data in the CDA/Spectrum database. We keep an acquisition if the bidder owns less than 50 percent of the 
target prior to the bid and is seeking to own greater than 50 percent of the target. For completed deals, we require 
that the bidder owns more than 90 percent of the target after the deal completion. All dollar amounts are in 2002 
millions of dollars, all percentages are in real numbers. We further require that the relative size of the deal is no less 
than 5 percent. Bidder (Target) CAR3 is over days (−1, 1), where day 0 is the date of the initial bid announcement 
by the acquiring firm. Daily abnormal stock returns are computed using the market model and the value-weighted 
CRSP index. The estimation window is days (−200, −60) prior to the acquisition announcement date. Premium is the 
ratio of the final offer price to the target’s trading price four weeks prior to the original announcement date minus 
one. Complete is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the deal is completed, and zero otherwise. Cross-
holdings are defined as the ratio of the shareholder’s percentage ownership in the target divided by her percentage 
ownership in the bidder. Bidder (Target) Top-20% (Median) Cross-holding is the (marginal) cross-holding for the 
top 20 (50) percent of institutional shareholdings. Complete, All Cash, All Stock, Competing, and Diversifying are 
dummy variables that take the value of one for completed acquisitions, if only cash is used to pay for the acquisition, 
if only equity is used, if there are multiple bids for the same target within one year, if the bidder and target are from 
two different industries, respectively, and zero otherwise. Relative Size is the transaction value divided by the 
market value of bidder assets at the end of the fiscal year prior to the bid announcement. Bidder (Target) Total 
Institutional Ownership is the fraction of a bidder’s (target’s) stock that is owned by institutional investors. All 
accounting values are obtained at the fiscal year-end prior to the announcement of the bid. Columns (1)-(2) are 
regression results based on a sample of deals where the total institutional ownership in the bidder is no less than 20 
percent. Columns (3)-(4) are regression results based on a sample of deals where both bidder and target total 
institutional ownership are no less than 20 percent. All model specifications include year and industry fixed effects 
and employ robust standard errors. Superscripts ***, **, and * correspond to statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 
10 percent levels, respectively. P-values are reported in brackets. 
 










        
Bidder Top-20% Cross-holding  0.008    0.005   
 [0.208]    [0.586]   
Bidder Median Cross-holding    -0.001    -0.025 
   [0.960]    [0.135] 
Target Top-20% Cross-holding      0.002   
     [0.803]   
Target Median Cross-holding        0.033* 
       [0.075] 
All Cash  0.017***  0.016***  0.021***  0.020*** 
 [0.005]  [0.006]  [0.002]  [0.002] 
All Stock  -0.014**  -0.014**  -0.011*  -0.011* 
 [0.016]  [0.018]  [0.083]  [0.072] 
Competing 0.000  0.000  -0.001  -0.002 
 [0.989]  [1.000]  [0.836]  [0.809] 
Diversifying 0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001 
 [0.810]  [0.877]  [0.851]  [0.861] 
Relative Size  -0.007  -0.008  -0.009  -0.009 
 [0.150]  [0.122]  [0.163]  [0.134] 
Bidder Total Institutional Ownership  0.007  0.000  -0.005  -0.019 
 [0.667]  [0.987]  [0.829]  [0.334] 
Target Total Institutional Ownership  0.003  0.010  0.016  0.030 
 [0.853]  [0.518]  [0.470]  [0.122] 
Bidder Market Capitalization  0.006  0.005  0.004  0.004 
 [0.109]  [0.115]  [0.295]  [0.291] 
Target Market Capitalization  -0.009**  -0.008**  -0.008*  -0.007* 
 [0.021]  [0.034]  [0.070]  [0.075] 
Bidder Market Leverage  0.017  0.016  0.023  0.023 
 [0.452]  [0.472]  [0.352]  [0.369] 
Bidder Market-to-Book Ratio  -0.003*  -0.003*  -0.003*  -0.003* 
 [0.066]  [0.061]  [0.068]  [0.054] 
Bidder Return on Assets  -0.008  -0.009  -0.002  -0.002 
 [0.660]  [0.632]  [0.913]  [0.924] 
Bidder Prior Year Stock Return  -0.002  -0.002  0.002  0.002 
 [0.535]  [0.572]  [0.654]  [0.638] 
Intercept -0.015  -0.017  -0.025  -0.024 
 [0.471]  [0.434]  [0.275]  [0.297] 
        
Yr, Ind. Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of Observations  1379  1379  1071  1071 















      
Bidder Top-20% Cross-holding  -0.012    0.012   
 [0.483]    [0.556]   
Bidder Median Cross-holding    -0.037    -0.051 
   [0.227]    [0.157] 
Target Top-20% Cross-holding      -0.042**   
     [0.036]   
Target Median Cross-holding        -0.007 
       [0.864] 
All  Cash  0.041** 0.042** 0.048** 0.049** 
  [0.028] [0.026] [0.016] [0.014] 
All Stock  -0.024*  -0.024*  -0.037**  -0.035** 
  [0.079] [0.081] [0.013] [0.017] 
Competing -0.027**  -0.026**  -0.025*  -0.024 
  [0.046] [0.049] [0.092] [0.105] 
Diversifying -0.023*  -0.023*  -0.027**  -0.025* 
  [0.060] [0.063] [0.039] [0.059] 
Relative Size  0.016*  0.016*  0.007  0.007 
  [0.085] [0.078] [0.513] [0.498] 
Bidder Total Institutional Ownership  0.017  0.018  0.087*  0.036 
  [0.674] [0.660] [0.086] [0.467] 
Target Total Institutional Ownership  0.042  0.035  0.021  0.065 
  [0.273] [0.316] [0.695] [0.171] 
Bidder  Market  Capitalization  0.052*** 0.052*** 0.041*** 0.043*** 
  [<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] 
Target  Market  Capitalization  -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.036*** -0.038*** 
  [<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] 
Target  Market  Leverage  0.022 0.022 0.007 0.018 
  [0.624] [0.624] [0.904] [0.738] 
Target Market-to-Book Ratio  -0.008**  -0.008**  -0.009**  -0.008** 
  [0.015] [0.016] [0.022] [0.029] 
Target Return on Assets  0.051  0.051  0.047  0.052 
  [0.151] [0.147] [0.255] [0.199] 
Target Prior Year Stock Return  -0.044***  -0.045***  -0.037***  -0.038*** 
  [<0.001]  [<0.001] [0.002] [0.001] 
Intercept 0.138***  0.132**  0.040  0.033 
  [0.009] [0.012] [0.463] [0.544] 
      
Yr,  Ind.  Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number  of  Observations  1381 1381 1072 1072 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.151 0.151 0.164 0.162 










      
Bidder Top-20% Cross-holding  -0.013    0.050   
 [0.655]    [0.114]   
Bidder Median Cross-holding    0.024    0.030 
   [0.651]    [0.614] 
Target Top-20% Cross-holding      -0.098***   
     [0.005]   
Target Median Cross-holding        -0.072 
       [0.279] 
All  Cash  0.010 0.011 0.026 0.027 
  [0.761] [0.742] [0.361] [0.352] 
All  Stock  -0.020 -0.021 -0.034 -0.032 
  [0.451] [0.444] [0.150] [0.174] 
Competing  0.023 0.023 0.040 0.042 
  [0.396] [0.395] [0.155] [0.139] 
Diversifying  -0.030 -0.030 -0.018 -0.016 
  [0.170] [0.176] [0.410] [0.466] 
Relative  Size  0.091*** 0.092*** 0.081*** 0.082*** 
  [<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] 
Bidder Total Institutional Ownership  -0.015  0.001  0.255***  0.167** 
  [0.853] [0.986] [0.002] [0.024] 
Target Total Institutional Ownership  -0.040  -0.053  -0.104  -0.013 
  [0.563] [0.428] [0.218] [0.868] 
Bidder  Market  Capitalization  0.093*** 0.093*** 0.080*** 0.085*** 
  [<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] 
Target  Market  Capitalization  -0.112*** -0.114*** -0.097*** -0.105*** 
  [<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] 
Bidder  Market  Leverage  0.099 0.100 0.039 0.063 
  [0.383] [0.380] [0.675] [0.492] 
Bidder Market-to-Book Ratio  0.002  0.002  0.008**  0.009** 
  [0.723] [0.713] [0.038] [0.027] 
Bidder Return on Assets  0.015  0.016  -0.053  -0.044 
  [0.837] [0.829] [0.474] [0.564] 
Bidder Prior Year Stock Return  0.024  0.024  -0.001  -0.002 
  [0.206] [0.206] [0.960] [0.899] 
Intercept  0.454*** 0.460*** 0.265*** 0.268*** 
  [<0.001]  [<0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
      
Yr,  Ind.  Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number  of  Observations  1337 1337 1051 1051 
Adjusted R-squared  0.121  0.121  0.160  0.153 
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Bidder Top-20% Cross-holding  0.074    0.246   
 [0.544]    [0.133]   
Bidder Median Cross-holding    0.034    -0.068 
   [0.898]    [0.842] 
Target Top-20% Cross-holding      -0.167   
     [0.301]   
Target Median Cross-holding        0.517 
       [0.211] 
Premium 0.042  0.040  0.062  0.082 
  [0.701] [0.711] [0.719] [0.634] 
All  Cash  -0.469*** -0.473*** -0.481*** -0.489*** 
 [<0.001]  [<0.001]  [0.001]  [<0.001] 
All  Stock  -0.031 -0.029 -0.057 -0.059 
  [0.781] [0.797] [0.651] [0.643] 
Competing  -1.169*** -1.169*** -1.259*** -1.263*** 
  [<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] 
Diversifying 0.109  0.104  0.151  0.153 
  [0.243] [0.266] [0.173] [0.167] 
Relative Size  -0.038  -0.042  0.002  -0.003 
  [0.560] [0.515] [0.977] [0.968] 
Bidder Total Institutional Ownership  0.737**  0.683**  0.875**  0.463 
  [0.019] [0.023] [0.034] [0.204] 
Target Total Institutional Ownership  -0.074  -0.012  -0.567  -0.092 
  [0.787] [0.962] [0.168] [0.794] 
Bidder  Market  Capitalization  0.301*** 0.300*** 0.351*** 0.355*** 
  [<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] 
Target  Market  Capitalization  -0.279*** -0.271*** -0.365*** -0.382*** 
  [<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] 
Bidder Market Leverage  0.145  0.140  0.108  0.132 
  [0.711] [0.720] [0.821] [0.780] 
Bidder Market-to-Book Ratio  -0.005  -0.005  0.013  0.010 
  [0.843] [0.818] [0.647] [0.733] 
Bidder Return on Assets  -0.285  -0.292  0.065  0.086 
  [0.260] [0.249] [0.817] [0.760] 
Bidder Prior Year Stock Return  0.089  0.091  0.150*  0.152* 
  [0.178] [0.171] [0.074] [0.068] 
Intercept  6.271*** 6.265*** 6.342*** 6.435*** 
  [<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] 
      
Yr,  Ind.  Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number  of  Observations  1316 1316 1035 1035 
Pseudo R-squared  0.205  0.204  0.240  0.240 
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Cross-holdings and Managerial Incentives 
 
The sample consists of 1,179 acquisitions announced during the period January 1, 1984, to December 31, 2002 with 
available data on measures of corporate governance. The bidders and targets are listed in the SDC’s Mergers and 
Acquisitions database and have institutional holding data in the CDA/Spectrum database. We keep an acquisition if 
the bidder owns less than 50 percent of the target prior to the bid and is seeking to own greater than 50 percent of the 
target. For completed deals, we require that the bidder owns more than 90 percent of the target after the deal 
completion. The G-index is defined based on Gompers et al. (2003), and the E-index is defined based on Bebchuk et 
al. (2006). Superscripts ***, **, and * correspond to statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, 















Cross-holding  G-index 
          
Target Total Institutional Ownership  0.319***         
 [<0.001]         
                        
Bidder Top-20% Cross-holding  -0.104***  0.600***       
 [<0.001]  [<0.001]       
                        
Bidder Median Cross-holding  -0.061**  0.372***  0.608***     
 [0.036]  [<0.001]  [<0.001]     
          
G-index 0.057*  -0.002  -0.030  -0.027   
 [0.051]  [0.946]  [0.302]  [0.364]   
                        
E-index -0.004  -0.125***  -0.114***  -0.071**  0.712*** 
 [0.899]  [<0.001]  [<0.001]  [0.015]  [<0.001] 
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